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RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF UNION MEMBERS;
FEDERAL LAW OR STATE LAW?
Since the passage of the labor reform legislation of 1959, a member
of a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce has
certain federally-recognized rights in addition to his rights under state
law. In many instances he may have a choice between a state and a
federal forum when he seeks a remedy against his union. In this Com-
ment, the federal rights and remedies and the existing Washington law
will be examined in broad summary form1 in order to evaluate the fac-
tors influencing the choice of forum.
MEMBER RIGHTS UNDER THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING
AND DIsCLOsURE ACT OF 19592
For several years the lack of internal democracy in many labor
unions' and the inadequate recognition afforded to the membership,
and property rights of the individual members' has been a cause of
concern to scholars5 and the public. The publicity given to the prob-
lem by the McClellan committee's6 exposure of abuses of power by
some labor leaders resulted in the inclusion in the 1959 act of a bill
of rights for union members.7 These sections are designed to insure
to all union members an equal voice (subject to reasonable union rules
and regulations) in the nomination and election of candidates; equal
participation and voting rights at union meetings; freedom of speech
'Detailed exposition and comment may be found in BNA OPERATIONS MANxUAL,
THE LABOR REFORM LAW (1959) ; COMERaC CLEARING HousE, Ikc.,NEw LABOR LAW
Or 1959, WITH EXPLANATIONS (1959). For historical background and discussion of the
law see Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73
HARv. L. REv. 851 (1960). For Washington law see 1 WASH. L. REv. 274 (1926);
15 WASH. L. REv. 267 (1940).
s Pub. Law 86-257, 73 STAT. 519; 29 U.S.C. § 429 (Supp. 1959).
s See BROMWICH, FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, STUDY OF UNION CONSTITUTIONS (1959).
4 See Hays, Union and Its Members: The Uses of Democracy, 11 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB.
35 (1958); Summers, Public Interest in Union Democracy, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 610
(1959) ; Forkosch, Internal Affairs of Unions: Government Control or Self-Regula-
tion?,.3 LA. L.J. 699-706, 728-31 (1952) ; Summers, Political Liberties of Labor Union
Members-A Comment, 33 TExAs L. REV. 603 (1955);; Protection of Members' Inter-
ests in Funds of Unincorporated Unions, 33 ID. L.J. 67 (1957) ; Graham, Rights and
Remedies of Members in "Intern Unio, Controversies in the Southern Jurisdictions,12 VAND. L. REV. 888 (1959).
5 Cox, Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 609 (1959);
Summers, Role of Legislation in Internal Union Affairs, 10 LAB. L.J. 155 (1959);
Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation, 67 YALE L. J. 1327 (1958);
Summers, Union Powers and Workers' Rights, 49 MICH. L. REv. 805 (1959).
a Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management
Field, Senate Resolution 74 of the 1st Session of the 85th Congress, 1957.
Public Law 86-257; 73 STAT. 522, 523; 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (Supp. 1959).
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and assembly; safeguards against improper disciplinary action;8 pro-
tection against increased dues and assessments except by majority
vote; protection of the right to sue (subject to exhaustion of reason-
able hearing procedures within the organization); and the right to
receive or inspect a copy of collective bargaining agreements which
affect the rights of the employee. The remedy for infringement of any
of these rights by a labor organization is a suit in federal district court
for appropriate relief, including injunctions.
Apart from the sections constituting the bill of rights, other sections
of the act afford increased protection to member rights. Subchapter
V of the act lays down detailed requirements to be observed by labor
organizations concerning terms of office, election procedures, and the
removal of officers.9 A union member may challenge an election by
reason of alleged violations of Subchapter V. After exhausting reme-
dies within the organization, or having failed to obtain a final decision
via such remedies within three months, he may file a complaint with
the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary is empowered to resort to civil
action, if he finds the complaint well founded, to enforce the election
provisions of the act.
The act also requires each labor organization to make a compre-
hensive report to the Secretary of Labor, setting forth the constitu-
tion and bylaws of the organization together with a detailed statement
of policies and procedures concerning the operation of union affairs
and relations with members." A financial report must also be made
annually. This same information must be made available to all union
members and any member may, for just cause, enforce, in state or fed-
eral district court, his right to examine any books or records necessary
to verify the information. Not only is the member entitled to be in-
formed as to the financial affairs of the union, but he is also given the
right, under certain conditions, to enforce the fiduciary responsibility
of union officers. He may bring suit, either in the federal district court
or in a competent state court, to require an accounting or to obtain
damages on behalf of the union. Any affected union member may sue
iD the federal district court to enforce the provisions of Title III relat-
ing to trusteeships of subordinate labor organizations, or by written
complaint, initiate investigation by the Secretary of Labor, who is em-
powered to bring a civil action against an offending organization.
8 73 STAT. 523, 541; 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(5), 530 (Supp. 1959).
9 73 STAT. 532; 29 U.S.C. § 481 (Supp. 1959).
10 73 STAT. 524, 525; 29 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. 1959).
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The coverage of the federal statute is broad but Washington law
continues to be significant because existing union-member rights and
remedies under state law are expressly preserved.11 Also, state law
could be influential in the interpretation of the rights and remedies
given by the federal statute. Although the United States Supreme
Court has held that federal courts will shape federal law where fed-
eral rights are concerned,12 it has also said that federal courts may
look to state law, when it is compatible with the federal policy, to aid
in fashioning federal remedies in cases not expressly covered by statu-
tory mandate.3 Washington case law on union member rights, while
not as broad in scope as the federal statute, is substantially in har-
mony with it.
With regard to court intervention in union affairs, Washington has
used the rules applicable to mutual benefit societies and other volun-
tary unincorporated associations. The courts will not interfere with
internal procedure and discipline of such associations in the absence
of fraud or illegal or arbitrary action, 4 but will intervene when nec-
essary to protect valuable property. rights against actions which vio-
late due process of law. 5 A property interest has been found in the
right to retain union membership when the right to earn a living in a
chosen profession, 6 or employment, 17 or property rights in the union
treasury, 8 or the right to recover on a death benefit certificate depends
upon such membership. 9 Suits have also been entertained concerning
the salary rights of union officers" and the ownership and control of
1173 STAT. 523; 29 U.S.C. § 413 (Supp. 1959).
12 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1942) ; Jerome v. United
States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943).
1 Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351 (1939) ; Stone v. White,
301 U.S. 532 (1935).
'4 Stivers v. Blethen, 124 Wash. 473, 215 Pac. 7 (1923); Kelly v. Grand Circle
Women, 40 Wash. 691, 82 Pac. 1007 (1905).
15 Mahoney v. Sailor's Union, 45 Wn.2d 453, 275 P.2d 440 (1954); Washington
Local Lodge 104 v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 33 Wn.2d 1, 203 P2d 1019
(1948); Leo v. Local 612, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 26 Wn.2d 498, 174 P.2d
523 (1946) ; Furniture Workers Local 1007 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 6 Wn.2d 654,
108 P.2d 651 (1940) ; Cox v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 190 Wash. 511, 69 P.2d 148
(1937) ; Ray v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 182 Wash. 39, 44 P.2d 787 (1935);
State ex rel. Cicoria v. Corgiat, 50 Wash. 95, 96 Pac. 689 (1908).
16 Poole v. National Organization of Masters, 155 Wash. Dec. 507, 348 P.2d 986
(1960).
17 Leo v. Local 612, Intl Union of Operating Eng'rs, 26 Wn2d 498, 174 P.2d 523
(1946).
18 Mahoney v. Sailor's Union, 45 Wn.2d 453, 275 P.2d 440 (1954).
19 Ray v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 182 Wash. 39, 44 P.2d 787 (1935).
20 Washington Local Lodge 104 v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 33 Wn.2d 1,
203 P2d 1019 (1948) ; 28 Wn. 2d. 536, 183 P.2d. 504 (1947).
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union property and funds.2
Action taken by a union is without jurisdiction and void when the
scope of powers laid down in the union constitution and bylaws is
exceeded, or when procedural due process is lacking. The injured
party has access to the courts to have the action or order declared
invalid and to obtain relief. In Ray v. Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men22 it was held that the union had no jurisdiction to expel a member
because he voted against the union in a representation election. This
was not within the grounds for which discipline was authorized under
the rules of the Brotherhood. Recovery by the beneficiary of his death
benefit certificate could not be defeated because of the alleged loss of
membership. Similarly, in Leo v. Local 612, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs2 solicitation of other members to join another craft union was
not a violation of the union constitution and the union had no juris-
diction to expel Leo for such action. Also, he was not given notice of
charges or an opportunity to prepare a defense. His reinstatement was
ordered with recovery for lost wages. In Cox v. United Bhd. of Car-
penters,24 the constitution and bylaws of a parent union were said to
constitute a binding contract between the association and its members.
An attempted revocation of the charter of a local union by the parent
union was void when the laws of the parent union gave no authority
for a revocation and no charges were filed or hearing given. A declara-
tory judgment was issued to the effect that the local was still in exist-
ence and was entitled to its property. It has been stated to be the
universal rule that no number of members less than the whole can
divert the funds of the union to uses other than those defined in its
constitution and laws.25
Provisions in union constitutions authorizing summary action with-
out notice or hearing are invalid because they violate the law of the
land.26
The federal protection of members' rights to free speech and assem-
bly is subject to the right of the union to enforce reasonable rules as
21 Furniture Workers' Local 1007 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 6 Wn.2d 654, 108
P.2d. 651 (1940) ; Lumber & Sawmill Workers' Union, 2623 v. International Wood-
workers, 197 Wash. 491, 85 P.2d 1099 (1939) ; Cox. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 190
Wash. 511, 69 P.2d 148 (1937) ; Centralia Labor Temple Ass'n v. Day, 139 Wash. 331,
246 Pac. 930 (1926).
22 182 Wash. 39, 44 P.2d 787 (1935).
22 26 Wn.2d 498, 174 P.2d 523 (1946).
24 190 Wash. 511, 69 P.2d 148 (1937).
25 Local 2618, Plywood Workers v. Taylor, 197 Wash. 515, 85 P.2d 1116 (1938).
26 Washington Local Lodge 104 v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 33 Wn.2d 1,
203 P.2d 1019 (1948) ; Furniture Workers' Local 1007 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters,
6 Wn.2d 654, 108 P.2d 651 (1940) (suspension of local and seizure of property).
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to the responsibility of every member towards the organization as an
institution.27 The interpretation of what is reasonable in this regard
must await development through decided cases. Washington has taken
a broad view of members' rights to oppose union leaders and policy,
and also the union itself. As mentioned above, making a speech at a
union meeting opposing union policies," soliciting other workers to join
another union,2" and voting against the union in a representation elec-
tion"0 have been treated as protected activity and would presumably
not constitute disloyalty to the union as an institution. In Selles v.
Local 174, Int'l Bkd. of Teamsters,3 the court said that the right of
self-organization includes the right to attempt to change the leader-
ship and policies of the union.
However, in joining a union, a member consents to be bound by its
rules and to be disciplined for infractions thereof. 2 The mode of dis-
cipline as prescribed by the organic law of the union must be followed
and proceedings must be in good faith.33 However, in a recent case,
Poole v. National Organization of Masters,"4 a member who was sus-
pended in 1948 for refusing to pay a disciplinary fine was entitled to
be reinstated nine years later upon his tender of a sufficient sum to
cover back dues, the fine, and a reinstatement fee. The union consti-
tution stated that a member suspended for non-payment of dues or
other indebtedness may be reinstated upon payment of all money
owing. The court construed this to be permissive only, as to the mem-
ber, and to leave no option to the union, which was required to re-
instate him upon his complying tender. The court said that Poole
could not follow his profession without union membership, and the
union could not be permitted to bar a member permanently from his
employment for a relatively minor breach of the rules.
The right to bring suit under the federal statute may be conditioned
on the member's exhausting reasonable hearing procedures within the
organization, not exceeding a four month lapse of time. Washington
2773 STAT. 522; 29 U.S.C. § 411 (Supp. 1959).23Mahoney v. Sailor's Union, 45 Wn.2d 453, 275 P.2d 440 (1954).29 Leo v. Local 612, Int'l Union of Operating Engrs, 26 Wn.2d 498, 174 P.2d 523
(1946).
30 Ray v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 182 Wash. 39, 44 P.2d 787 (1935).8150 Wn.2d 660, 314 P.2d 456 (1957).
32Minch v. Local 370, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 44 Wn.2d 15, 265 P.2d 286(1953) ; Yeager v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 39 Wn.2d 807, 239 P.2d 318 (1951).33 Minch v. Local 370, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 44 Wn.2d 15, 265 P.2d 286
(1953).
34155 Wash. Dec. 507, 348 P.2d 986 (1960).
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has required exhaustion of reasonable internal procedures" but has
recognized a number of exceptions to the rule. No appeal within the
union is necessary when the union action or order is void for lack of
jurisdiction or procedural due process,"6 when financial matters are
involved,37 when there would be unreasonable delay,38 or when appeal
would be futile.39 Whether a member has exhausted his remedies is
a determination of fact for the jury. °
In concluding this summary of Washington law, mention may be
made of Washington's anti-blacklisting statute. 1 No case has been
found in which there was reliance on the statute in an action against
a union. Arnold v. National Union of Marine Cooks42 involved a letter
sent by a union agent to other unions. The letter charged that certain
men were "renegades"; that they had deserted the union and attempt-
ed to break a strike. A list of the men's names was attached to each
letter. The case was decided against the union on the basis of libel
per se, without mention of the anti-blacklisting statute, although the
NLRB had no difficulty in finding the same letter to be a blacklist."
ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP
No attempt was made by Congress to control union policies regard-
ing admission to membership. An amendment to the house bill de-
signed to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, color,
sex, and national origin, both in representation and in admission to
membership, was defeated.44 Washington's "Law Against Discrimina-
tion in Employment"45 makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
to deny full membership rights and privileges to any person because
of race, creed, color or national origin except in the case of a bona
fide occupational qualification or need. Whether this also covers ad-
mission to membership is not clear. The court has said that admission
35 Couie v. Local 1849, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 51 Wn.2d 108, 316 P.2d 473
(1957) ; Constantino v. Moreschi, 9 Wn.2d 638, 115 P.2d 955 (1941).
36 Ray v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 182 Wash. 39, 44 P.2d 787 (1935).
37 Washington Local Lodge 104 v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 28 Wn.2d
536, 183 P.2d 504 (1947).
38 Washington Local Lodge 104 v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 158 Wash.
480, 291 Pac. 328 (1930).
30 Washington Local Lodge 104 v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 33 Wn.2d 1,
203 P.2d 1019 (1948) ; Furniture Workers' Local 1007 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters,
6 Wn.2d 654, 108 P.2d 651 (1940).
40 Minch v. Local 370, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 44 Wn.2d 15, 265 P.2d 286
(1953).
41 RCW 49.44.010.
42 36 Wn.2d 557, 219 P.2d 121 (1950) aff'd 44 Wn.2d 183, 265 P.2d 1051 (1954).
43 29 LABOR RELATIONS REFERENCE MANUAL 1376 (1952).
44 105 CONG. REC. 14388 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1959).
45 RCW 49.60.190.
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to membership is within the control of the union ' and the fact that a
man is eligible for membership under provisions of the union consti-
tution does iot entitle him to membership as of right."7
CHOICE OF FORUm
In selecting the court in which a suit should be brought, procedural
advantages are unlikely to be a factor because Washington's new rules
of civil procedure are comparable to federal court procedure. Differ-
ences between the federal law and state law with regard to the scope
of substantive rights are obviously, a major factor. In the formative
years while federal law is being developed, the degree of predictability
in the state courts, where there is case authority, will undoubtedly be
a consideration.
The possibility of recovering expenses might make the federal forum
desirable in appropriate cases. It should be noted that section 201 (c)
of the federal statute,48 which allows a union member to enforce the
right to examine union books and records, permits the court to award
a reasonable attorney's fee in its discretion. Such a suit may be brought
in either a state court or in federal district court. Also, section 501 (b) 9
which deals with suits by members for an accounting or to recover
damages for the benefit of the union, permits allotment of a reason-
able part of the recovery for attorney's fees and expenses of the mem-
ber. If a prospective suit can be brought within the coverage of these
sections, it may make the vindication of a right possible where the
monetary recovery expectable would not otherwise support the cost
of suit. There is no provision for attorney's fees and costs in suits to
enforce the bill of rights sections. Such a provision" would have put
teeth into these sections of the statute. The omission may make the
difference between an enforceable statute and an idealistic statement
of principles. A Labor Union-Fair Practices Bill introduced in the
1959 session of the Washington legislature5 included provision for
costs and reasonable attorney's fees in suits to enforce its provisions,
46 Kanzler v. Linoleum Workers, 20 Wn2d 718, 149 P.2d 276 (1944).47 Yeager v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 39 Wn.2d 807, 239 P2d 318 (1951)
(admission denied because of unemployment among existing members).4 $ PUB. LAw 257, TITLE II § 201 (a-c) ; 73 STAT. 524; 29 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. 1959).
4 73 STAT. 535; 29 U.S.C. § 501 (b) (Supp. 1959).
50 Some federal statutes which permit the award of a reasonable attorney's fee in
suits to enforce the statute are 15 U.S.C. § 15 (anti-trust suits); § 72 (unfair compe-
tition in import trade) ; 17 U.S.C. § 116 (copyright infringement); 15 U.S.C. § 77www
(false or misleading statements under Trust Indenture Act) ; 15 U.S.C. § 78i (manipu-
lation of security prices) ; 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (tort claims against the U.S.) ; 49 U.S.C.§ 908 (injuries by unlawful acts of water-carriers in interstate and foreign commerce).
51 S.B. 319, H.B. 528.
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but the proposed legislation did not leave committee.
State and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction of suits arising
under the laws of the United States, except in certain instances where
the jurisdiction has been restricted by Congress to the federal courts."
The enforcement section of the bill of rights does not state unequivo-
cally that federal jurisdiction is to be exclusive for enforcement of
these federally-created rights, although the language is susceptible to
the interpretation that exclusiveness was intended." The fact that a
choice of federal or state forum is given for other causes of action
created by the act, while this section is silent as to choice, also sug-
gests exclusiveness. The need for uniformity could be given as a rea-
son. The question is still open, however, and it may be possible to
sue in state court, relying on the federally-created rights. Federal
policy would necessarily be followed by the state court if concurrent
jurisdiction exists.
The possibility of conflict between federal policy and the state
rights and remedies that are saved seems unlikely to be a problem in
Washington.
JOYcE M. THOMAS
52 Grubb v. Public Util's Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930).
53 73 STAT. 523, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1959).
[VOL. 35
